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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND ASSOCI-
ATES, a Utah corporation, and HAROLD 
K. BEECHER, an Individual 
Defendants and Respondents 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10609 
This case involves a complaint by a foreman employee 
of the general contractor, Christiansen Brothers, Inc., 
against a third party, Harold K. Beecher and Associates, 
a Utah corporation, the architect, and against one of its 
employees, Harold K. Beecher, an individual, for personal 
injuries suffered in a cave-in of an excavation. 
The complaint is in two Counts, the first ex deL1cto and 
the second ex contractu. 
Neither of the two alleged actions contain the neces-
sary allegations against the architect for alleged failure 
"to meet the standard of learning, skill and conduct or-
dinarily possessed by architects - practicing in the same 
or similar localities". 
2 
Appellant's complaint merely alleges a failure to ex. 
ercise a discretionary judgment of the architect to stop 
work on a utility tunnel being constructed in a trench 
excavation as an insurer or guarantor against an accident 
to any employee of the general contractor from a possible 
cave-in of the excavation. 
The two alleged actions also involve the legal relation-
ship of co-employees - two independent contractors _ 
the architect and the general contractor and their co. 
employees engaged in the same common project, namely, 
the construction and supervision of construction of the 
tracting owners, Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County. 
The nature of the case need be further particularized 
by the fact that the contracting owners are not private 
but public corporations, being an incorporated municipal-
ity, and a county (a political subdivision) of the State of 
Utah, each of which has its own continuously employed 
engineer and his staff with supervisory powers over the 
architect. (Par. 13, Architect's Contract, R. 161.) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial Court dismissed the complaints of the plain· 
tiff with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENTS ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to uphold the judgment of dismissal 
with prejudice of plaintiff's complaints, COUNTS I and ' 
II against both defendants-respondents. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Over a period of nearly ten months, from May 26, 1965 
to March 16, 1966, plaintiff filed four different com-
plaints, the last of which, entitled second amended com-
plaint (R. 146-163) is material here. 
The plaintiff incorporates in his statement of facts 
(App. Brief, pp. 3 to 12) excerpts from the contract of the 
general contractor, Christiansen Brothers, Inc., and from 
the agreement of the architect, Harold K. Beecher and 
Associates, a Utah corporation, (Exhibit A, R. 156-163) 
with the joint owners. These quotations from said con-
tract and agreement are believed to be accurate. 
The total excavation to allow construction of the util-
ity tunnel was about 600 feet. For safety reasons, the con-
tractor would excavate about 100 to 125 feet at one time, 
construct the utility tunnel in the excavation and then 
backfill that part of the excavation. The excavation had 
been backfilled from the east-westward for about two-
thirds of the distance without any cave-in up to Octo-
ber 17, 1963. 
In appellant's supplemental statement of facts (App. 
Brief, pp. 35-37) under the heading "ARGUMENT", ap-
pellant's counsel goes outside of the record and inappro-
priately gives his own statements as to what (in his opin-
ion) the evidence will show in plaintiff's favor. He does, 
however, admit to one fact, which the complaint does not 
allege, and with which defendants agree, that as required 
by paragraph 7 of the architect's agreement, the architect 
did appoint a qualified on-site inspector as its special 
agent to do the daily inspecting and supervising within 
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the scope of the architect's agreement when properly in-
terpreted in connection with the contractor's contract. 
The complaint does not allege that the qualified on-site 
inspector failed to perform any of his duties of inspection 
and supervision or that he performed them in a negligent 
manner. 
We will not concede that the statements of plaintiff's 
counsel in his appellate brief of what, in his opinion, the 
1 
evidence will show will substitute for the omission of 
necessary allegations in a complaint 
(a) of the scope of an architect's duty to do what 
qualified architects practicing in the same or 
similar localities would have done under similar 
circumstances, and 
(b) of a neglect of the architect to perform its duty 
as thus defined. 
Appellant's counsel states, again outside the record, 
that on one occasion a conference was had among the 
representatives of the contractor and of Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, the architect and the on-site inspectors 
of Salt Lake City and of the architect. (App. Brief, pp. 
35-36). 
Appellant's counsel does not state when the conference 
was held nor what it led to. Such a conference was held 1 
on or about September 15, 1963. Two highly material 
facts, omitted from plaintiff's brief, are that a question 
was raised as to whether the contractor's manner of exca· 
vation and shoring which had proved safe thus far should 
be made more safe, and as a result of such conference, a 
complaint was made by the City Engineer's office and the 1 
5 
architect to the State Industrial Commission that the 
shoring of the excavation was judged to be inadequate at 
that time. This resulted in an official inspection and in 
continuing official surveillance by the State Industrial 
Commission of safety measures at the excavation. 
The affidavit of John W. Holmes, safety inspector for 
the State Industrial Commission of Utah, which is in the 
record (R. 175-177), states, in substance and effect, that 
as a result of a complaint made to the State Industrial 
Commission of Utah the shoring in said excavation 
was inspected on September 17, 1963 and was judged by 
Mr. Holmes to be inadequate to comply with the Safety 
Regulations of the State Industrial Commission for ex-
cavations. 
Mr. Holmes immediately ordered work on the utility 
tunnel stopped. He ordered, on the spot, that the general 
contractor immediately and continuously thereafter pro-
vide sufficient shoring of the excavation to make it safe 
for workmen, and that an escape ladder be put into the 
excavation. (R. 175-176). 
Mr. Holmes reported his findings and action to Casper 
A. Nelson, the Commissioner of the State Industrial Com-
mission in charge of Safety Regulations and inspections. 
Commissioner Nelson then prepared and sent a letter to 
Christiansen Brothers, Inc. and included a copy of the 
Regulations of the State Industrial Commission regard-
ing methods for providing safe excavations, (R. 177), 
sloping of side walls or adequate shoring or a combination 
of both methods which, in the judgment of the State Safe-
ty Inspector, would prove adequate for reasonable safety 
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precautions (R. 177). Copies of the letter were also sent 
to the project foreman and the architect. 
State Inspector, John W. Holmes, ordered the method 
of additional shoring of the excavation as the safe method ' 
to be used by the contractor. Mr. Holmes again inspected 
the excavation on September 18, 1963; found that his 
orders for adequate shoring had been complied with and 
allowed work to proceed on the utility tunnel. 
State Inspector Holmes did inform the contractor .• 
that he would return for later inspections. He did not 
inform anyone when those inspections would be made. 
The fact is that State Inspector Holmes did, as late as ' 
October 4, 1963 make a surprise inspection of the excava· l 
tion and found that the pattern of shoring which he had ( 
earlier ordered and approved as a safe manner of exca· I 
vation with the degr7e of sloping which he had also ap· , 
proved was being followed and that the shoring of the 
excavation was in compliance with the Safety Regula-
tions of the State Industrial Commission of Utah. 
Appellants' counsel, at page 40 of their brief, make an 
untrue statement in characterizing Mr. Arthur 0. Nau· 
man as an "uninformed employee". Mr. Cassity knows or 
should recollect that Mr. Nauman had been an employee 
of Christiansen Brothers Inc., for many years and for 
about four years had been one of its prudent, competent 
and trusted foremen; that Mr. Nauman was foreman over 
the excavation and construction of the utility tunnel on 
October 16th and 17th 1963; that if the excavation were 
unsafe on said days, it was his primary, special duty to 
make it safe. Therefore if there were any negligence in 
j 
7 
failing to make the excavation safe then PLAINTIFF 
SEEKS RECOVERY FOR HIS OWN WRONG. 
Plaintiff Arthur 0. Nauman is a U.S. Veteran. Shortly 
after the accident, he was taken to the U. S. Veteran's 
Hospital in Long Beach, California where he received 
special physotherapy treatment for about two and one 
half years. He was transferred to the U.S. Veteran's Hos-
pital in Salt Lake City this spring where he is now re-
ceiving, and will continue to receive, the best of care. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. HAROLD K. BEECHER IS NOT A PARTY TO THE 
ARCHITECT'S CONTRACT AND THE ALLEGATIONS 
OF THE COMPLAINT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO RAISE 
THE QUESTION OF "ALTER EGO". 
Plaintiff-appellant alleges in paragraph 2 of his com-
plaints that "the defendants entered into an agreement 
with Salt Lake City Corporation - to provide profession-
al architectural services," etc. Apparently appellant has 
abandoned his claim that Harold K. Beecher is a con-
tracting party. Although appellant's counsel briefed and 
argued this claim before the trial court, he does not pre-
sent any such argument in the appellate brief. 
The architect's contract, Exhibit A to the complaints, 
recites that it is between Salt Lake City Corporation and 
Harold K. Beecher and Associates. It is signed, "Harold 
K. Beecher and Associates, Incorporated, By /s/ Harold 
K. Beecher, President" and "Harold K. Beecher and As-
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sociates, 'Architect' By /s/ Harold K. Beecher" and at-
tested by "/s/ Harold K. Beecher, Secretary". 
The use of the corporate name twice is merely repeti- 1 
tious. In both instances the word "By" preceding Mr. 
Beecher's name shows a signing in a representative ca-
pacity. Section 1342 of 19 Am. Jur. 2nd, Corporation, 
reads in part: 
A correct form of signature which is uniformly re-
garded as imposing no personal liability upon the 
i 
officer signing is that of a signature containing the I 
corporate name followed by the word 'per' or 'by' ~ 
which in turn is followed by the name of the cor- I 
porate officer. ' 
Paragraph 1 of the complaints allege that "during said t 
times alleged herein, defendant, Harold K. Beecher, an r 
individual - was an officer, director and general man-
ager of defendant corporation and was in charge of and 
had general supervision over the defendant corporation's 
operations under that certain architect's Agreement re-
ferred to in paragraph 2 hereof". However, as pointed out 
in the foregoing statement of facts, the architect did not 
appoint its President as its special agent to perform daily 
inspection and supervision work, but appointed a qual-
ified on-site inspector to perform those duties. 
The foregoing allegation does not raise an issue of 
whether Mr. Harold K. Beecher was the "alter ego" of 
the corporation. 
Proof that a person has absolute control over affairs of 
a corporation does not establish that he is the "alter ego" 
of the corporation. (General American Life Insurance Co. , 
vs. Anderson 1942 D. C. Ky. 46 F. Supp. 189, 195.) 
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To establish the "alter ego" doctrine, it must be shown 
that the stockholders disregard the entity of the corpora-
tion, made the corporation a mere conduit for the trans-
action of their own private business, and that the sep-
arate individualities of the corporation ceased to exist. 
(Sefton vs. San Diego Trust & Savings Bank 1940, Cal. 
App. 106 P. 2d 974, 984). 
In conclusion on POINT I, the judgment of dismissal 
with prejudice of the complaints against Harold K. 
Beecher, an individual should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF APPELLANT HAS NO VALID CLAIM 
FOR RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS ON HIS 
CLAIM TO BE A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY UN-
DER COUNT II OF HIS COMPLAINT. 
(A) ARCHITECT'S CONTRACT WITH OWNER 
FOR SUPERVISION IS FOR BENEFIT OF OWNER 
ALONE UNLESS CLEARLY INTENDED OTHER-
WISE. 
Mr. I. Vernon Werbin in his 1961 Volume on Law for 
Contractors, Architects and Engineers, pages 38-45 points 
out that contracts of an architect with the owner for 
supervision are made for the express benefit of the owner 
and that negligence which results in a defective end re-
sult whether from defective plans or specifications or 
from failure to exercise reasonable judgment and effort 
to secure compliance with his plans and specifications 
gives the employer the cause of action for breach of such 
contract. Lindberg v. Hodgens, 152 N.Y. Supp. 229. 
Schwartz v. Underhill, 1950, 95 Cal. 9.2d 700, 213, P. 2d 
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516. Hill v. Polar Pantries 219 S. C. 263, 64 S. E. 2d 855. 
The duty of an architect to his client is to exercise that 
degree of reasonable care and diligence exercised by men 
of his profession in the community where he practices; in 
examining the site, in preparation of plans and specifica-
tions, and in supervision of the work, to secure results of 
the work in accordance with the plans and specifications. 
He does not give any guarantee as to the results of the 
work. He is not an insurer. White v. Pallay, 119 Or. 97, 
247 P. 316; Henon v. Vernon, 68 Pa. Super. 608. There is 
no allegation of any such duty in the complaint. 
(B) ARCHITECT'S CONTRACT DOES NOT MAKE 
A GIFT OF EITHER A CONTRACT OR TORT AC-
TION TO PLAINTIFF. 
Diligent research has disclosed no appellate court de-
cision holding that an architect may be sued successfully 
on a claim for relief as a donee or incidental beneficiary. 
If an architect should contract for a separate and ade-
quate fee for inspection and supervision above the usual 
and customary architect's fee, then the problem of a 
creditor beneficiary would arise. This case does not pre-
sent a creditor beneficiary issue Even creditor bene-
ficiary contracts rest on clearly stated contractural in-
tent as is shown by the Utah case infra. 
The donee and incidental third party beneficiary cases 
are found in the annotations of the Restatement In The 
Courts - Permanent Edition 1932-44 and in the 1948 and 
1954 Supplements of Cases under the Restatement of 
Contracts. Section 145 contains the annotations under the 
heading: Beneficiaries under promises to the United 1 
States, a State or a municipality. 
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The cases show that the alleged beneficiary may re-
cover against contractors in only two situations: (a) if 
the affirmative act is inherently dangerous, or (b) if the 
act violates the absolute duty to maintain support to a 
neighbors land or to his land with improvements. 
The owner of realty may recover from a contractor for 
damages done to his premises under a contract between 
the contractor and a city wherein the contractor promises 
to pay "all damages done by blasting." Mourea v. Rhude, 
1940, 209 Minn. 53, 55, 295 N. W. 304, 306. Wilson v. Oliver 
Costich Company, 1939, 231 App. Div. 346, 351, 237 N. Y. 
Supp. 131, 136; aff'd., 256 N. Y. 629, 177 N. E. 169. Del 
Pizzo v. Middle West Coast Construction Company, 1941, 
146 P. Super. 345, 348, 22A. 2d 79, 80. Blasting in law is an 
inherently dangerous act, no matter how carefully done. 
The excavation of an open deep trench does not come 
within the tort doctrine of an inherently dangerous ac-
tivity, as will be shown by later cases. 
Except for third party beneficiary actions allowing 
against contractors as above stated, the cases are uniform 
that only the contracting owner, in privity of contract, 
may recover for breach of the contract. 
The New York case of Whitmore v. Fago, 1949, 93 N. Y. 
Supp. 2d, 672, 686, is in point. In that case, the contractor 
was performing a contract with the United States War 
Department in building a retaining wall on the Addison 
Flood Control Project. The contract called for installation 
of "sheeting and shoring" to be placed "for protection of 
the work and adjacent property". The contract also re-
cited that "the contractor should be responsible for all 
damages to property occurring as a result of negligence 
in connection with the work". 
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The Court held that the claimed donee beneficiary ac-
tion would not lie. The Court said in referring to the 
above contract provisions: 
I cannot read in them that in intention for a direct 
benefit of the plaintiff necessary before a stranger 
can sue for breach of contract as voiced by the United 
States Supreme Court: 'Before a stranger can avail 
himself of the exceptional privilege of suing for a 
breach of an agreement to which he is not a party, he 
must at least show that it was intended for his direct 
benefit. German Alliance Insurance Company v. 
Home Water Supply Company, 226 U.S. 220, 33 S. Ct. 
32, 35, 57 L. Ed. 195, 42 L. R. A., N. S. 1000.' 
In accord is another comparatively recent case, United 
Dispatch Inc. v. E. J. Albert Company, 1950, 135 W. Va. ' 
34, 62 S. E. 2d, 289, 295. A clause in the contract provided 
that the "contractor should be responsible" for damage 
to persons or property" as a result of his fault or negli-
gence in connection with the prosecution of the work". 
The Court held that no third party beneficiary action 
existed and reversed the Trial Court dismissing the ac· 
tion. The Court said regarding plaintiff's claim: 
We must consider the entire contract as well as the 
particular portions thereof relied upon by the plain· 
tiff. Upon such consideration of the entire contract 
in all of its multitudinous details we can reach no 
conclusion except that it was made for the sole bene-
fit of the contracting parties. 
Accord: Whitmore v. Fargo, 93 N.Y. S. 2d, 686, and 
semble accord: Kelly v. Richards & Willis-Overland Co., 
1939, 95 Ut. 560, 83 P. 2d 731, 129 A.L.R. 164. 
Dismissal of COUNT II of plaintiff's complaint for fail· 
ure to state a cause of action should be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
THE CONTRACTS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO 
GIVE CONTRACTOR THE USUAL RIGHTS AND 
DUTIES OF AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND 
THE EXTRAORDINARY RIGHT TO STOP WORK RE-
QUIRES JOINT COOPERATIVE JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff emphasizes one small phrase at the close of 
paragraph 7 of the architect's agreement on "General Ad-
ministration" which, out of context, says that the arch-
itect's on-site inspector has a duty "to supervise all phas-
es of the work being done". This merely means super-
vision to determine that each item of construction com-
plies with the specifications of the architect. 
The foundation of tort liability is that every person 
should be liable for his own wrong, but not for the wrong 
of another. If a person does an affirmative act which fore-
seeably, to an ordinary prudent man under the circum-
stances, will likely cause harm to another or the property 
of another, then liability for such harm is imposed by law. 
The wisdom of ago-old law has created a few rules of 
absolute liability which include the escape of wild ani-
mals or impounded water causing harm, the use of an in-
herently dangerous instrumentality or affirmatively en-
gaging in an ultrahazardous activity like blasting (but 
not for making an excavation) except where the excava-
tion withdraws lateral support of the soil from a neigh-
bors property causing damage. (Rest. of Torts, Section 
520 et. seq., on absolute liability for acts including ultra-
hazardous activity.) 
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. ~ara.graph. 13 of the architect's agreement for super. 
v1s1on is subJect to the superior control of the City En·. 
neer and County Engineer in every respect. It reads: gi 
13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer will represent 
the owner, Salt Lake City Corporation with respect 
to the agreement, and the architect shall perform and 
conduct all required services under his direction and 
supervision R. 161) . (Italics supplied) 
An independent contractor is a person engaged in an 
independent profession, vocation or calling in which he 
agrees to do a piece of work according to his own means 
and methods and free from control by the other contract-
ing party, except as to the result of the work. 
Christiansen Brothers, Inc. was the independent con-
tractor agreeing to construct the Metropolitan Hall of 
Justice Building according to its own means, methods 
and techniques of performance. 
Properly interpreted from all provisions of the arch-
itects and the contractors agreements it will be seen that , 
the extraordinary and unusual right to stop work must 
be done by joint, cooperative judgment of the City Engi-
neer, the Countny Engineer and the architect. 
The contractor agrees specifically in certain para· 
graphs of its contract to take all necessary precautions 
for the safety of its employees (Special Conditions Sec· 
tion of the Specifications, pars. 1 (b) and 17 (a), R. 149). 
The provisions of the contractor's contract hereafter 
mentioned which ref er to supervision by the architect 
are phrases of limitation. They state that the architect 
will supervise construction as a cooperative, joint activ· 
ity with the City and County Engineers. 
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Paragraph 3 (b) of the General Conditions Section of 
the Specifications states that Harold K. Beecher and As-
sociates 
will direct the supervision of construction and is act-
ing in cooperation with the City Engineer and Coun-
ty Engineer as outlined above in paragraph 3 and 
3 (a) ( R. 148) . (Italics added.) 
The Court will surely take judicial notice that provi-
sions are common in contracts for the construction of 
large buildings which provide that all work and materials 
are subject to inspection and rejection by the architect 
if the kind or quality of materials or equipment, or the 
completed work, does not conform to the detailed specifi-
cations. 
Paragraph 1 of the architect's agreement states that 
among other duties, the architect's "professional services" 
shall include "necessary conferences" and "the general 
administration of the construction contracts" regarding 
'architectural, structural, plumbing, heating, electrical 
and other mechanical work" (R. 156). This requires daily 
supervision not as to means or methods but as to the re-
sults of the work. The phrase "supervise all phases of the 
work being done" clearly means this kind of supervision. 
By reversing the position of the phrase which plaintiff 
requests should be interpreted in its broadest sense, we 
get the true meaning of paragraph 7 of the architect's 
agreement when also interpreted in the light of the fore-
going contractural provisions. The sentence will then 
read: 
The architect shall furnish "a qualified on-site inspec-
tor to supervise and inspect all phases of the work" "to 
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determine the quality and acceptance of the material 
and/or equipment proposed to be used in the facilities 
being constructed" (R. 159). This obviously would in-
clude materials and equipment, (tieing back to para. 
grap~ 1 supra) including also "structural, plumbing, 
heatmg, electrical and other mechanical work", etc. The 
clear purpose is not to control the general contractor as 
to means, methods and techniques, but daily supervision 
to see that the end result conforms to the drawings and 
specifications. 
POINT IV 
CONSTRUCTING AN OPEN EXCAVATION IS NOT 
ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITY LIKE BLASTING OR 
REMOVING THE STEEL SUPPORTS FROM A GYM-
NASIUM ROOF 
The general rule is "that an owner or employer is not 1 
responsible for the negligence of an independent con-
tractor". Werbin, Legal Cases for Contractors, Architects 
and Engineers, 1961, page 4. 
However, Mr. Werbin points out an exception to the 
general rule that the owner is liable for the 
failure of an independent contractor to exercise due 
care in respect to the performance of the work which 
is inherently or intrinsically dangerous. Inherently 
or intrinsically dangerous work has been variously 
defined, usually to the effect that it is work neces-
sarily attended with danger, no matter how skillfully 
or carefully it is performed. Ibid, page 6. 
The annotation in 23 A.L.R. 1084 reviews the various 
terminology used by the different courts to detennine 
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whether the particular fact situation presents an "ultra-
hazardous activity", as is claimed by the plaintiff in this 
case (par.14 of complaint, R.150). 
The statement of the legal test is rather uniformily 
worded as follows: Work "in its nature inherently dan-
gerous to others, however carefully performed". Ga. 13 
S.E., 277, 84 S.E. 451. 
"Work, necessarily attended with danger, however 
skillfully and carefully performed". Ill., 20 N.E. 33, N.Y. 
32 N.E. 1052, N. C. 45 S. E. 654, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 851, and 
Wash., 113 Pac.1093. 
It is common knowledge that injuries may happen in 
any construction project. "Many are attended with great 
danger if carelessly managed although with proper care 
they are not specially hazardous". Lafferty v. N. S. Gyp-
sum Company, 1910, 83 Kan. 349, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 930, 
111 Pac. 498. 
A case squarely in point follows: Where a trench was 
dug by steam shovel and operator hired by owner of 
property for that purpose, such work was not of a kind 
that contained an unreasonable or peculiar risk of bodily 
harm to workmen in the trench, recognizable by the 
property owner, and the owner was not liable for injuries 
to an employee of the plumbing contractor sustained as 
result of subsequent collapse of the side of the trench. 
Gibilterra v. Rosemawer Homes, 1955, 19 N. J. 166, 115 
A. 2d 553. 
A construction company which was constructing an ex-
tension to a building for a third party and had entered 
into a subcontract with a partnership for construction of 
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"caissons" necessary for the foundation of the extension 
was under no obligation to change the method of doing 
work or to warn plaintiff of that which was self-evident 
as respects company's liability for injuries received whe~ 
plaintiff fell into a hole which had been dug for the 
"caisson" while on the premises looking for employment. 
Forgione v. Frankini Construction Company, 1941, 398 
Mass. 29, 30 N.E. 2d 819. The condition of the excavation 
in this Nauman case was self-evident. 
An open trench is a danger which a mere licensee must 
avoid at his peril. Coleman v. Renesch, 1926, 18 Ohio App. 
177. And the excavation of an open trench is not an ultra-
hazardous activity for which absolute liability results in 1 
tort law if an injury occurs by a cave-in. Restatement of 
Torts, Sec. 520 et. seq. 
POINT V 
THE ARCHITECT HAD A RIGHT TO RELY ON THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE STATE SAFETY INSPECTOR 
AS THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN DETERMINING 
WHAT CONSTITUTED ADEQUADE SHORING AND 
WAS HELPLESS TO REQUIRE GREATER SAFETY 
PRECAUTIONS THAN THOSE APPROVED BY THE 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
The owners' contract with the contractor required that 
the contractor 
"take all necessary precautions for the safety of the 
public and employees on the work and shall comply 
with all applicable provisions of Federal, STATE and 
municipal Safety Laws and Building Codes to pre-
vent accident or injury to persons on, about or ad· 
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jacent to the premises where the work is being per-
formed. (Par. 1 (b) of the Special Conditions Section 
of the contractor's contract - R. 149) . 
An architect having participated in securing the official 
judgment of the Safety Inspector of the State Industrial 
Commission was entitled to rely upon the impartial judg-
ment which the State Safety Inspector made as to what 
constituted adequate shoring to comply with the Safety 
Regulations of that official body. (See Affidavit of State 
Safety Inspector John W. Holmes, R. 175-177). More than 
that, the architect was bound by the pattern of shoring 
which was officially approved. The architect could not 
compel the contractor to use greater safety precautions 
than the pattern of shoring approved by the State In-
dustrial Commission, which was followed beginning and 
after September 18, 1963. 
Having made that bona fide judgment, the architect 
should not be liable for such judgment on a claim of non-
feasance wherein the tort law of ultrahazardous activity 
does not apply. 
"The doctrine that where a public officer invested 
with discretion exercises his judgment in matters 
brought before him, he is usually given immunity 
from liability to persons who may be injured as a 
result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however, 
erroneous his judgment may be, provided the acts 
complained of are done with the scope of the officers 
authority and without willfullness, malice or cor-
ruption, - has been employed to protect from liability 
an architect whose plans and specifications have been 
approved by a public officer." Day v. National U. S. 
Radiator Corporation, 241, La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660. 
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POINT VI 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND ASSOCIATES, A UTAH 
CORPORATION, AND HAROLD K. BEECHER ARE 
IMMUNE FROM TORT LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 
35-1-62, UCA, 1953. 
To correct the earlier law which forbade a third party 
action by an injured employee who elected to take work-
men's compensation (Hamilton v. Commissioner of Fi-
nance, 1945, 108 Ut. 574, 162 P. 2d 58) the legislature 
amended the Workmen's Compensation Law of Utah in 
1945 to allow an action by an injured employee against a 
third party provided the parties were not engaged "in the 
same employment". Sec. 35-1-62, 1953 of the N.C.A. 
reads as follows: 
When any injury or death from which compensation 
is payable under this title shall have been caused by 
the wrongful action or neglect of another person not 
in the same employment and the injured employee, 
or in the case of death his dependents, may claim 
compensation and the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representative may also have an action 
for damages against such third person. If compensa-
tion is claimed and the employer or insurance carrier 
becomes obligated to pay compensation, the em-
ployer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of 
the cause of action against a third party, and may 
bring or maintain the action either in its own name 
or in the name of the injured employee or his heir or 
the personal representative of the deceased, provided 
the employer or the carrier may not settle and re-
lease the cause of action without the consent of the 
commission. 
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An analysis of the cases on the problem of immunity 
from third party liability, which also analyzes the Utah 
cases up to date is found in an extensive note in 9 Utah 
Law Review, 939-960, Winter, 1965. That Law Review 
article cites the 1963 case of Shirley D. Cook v. Peter 
Kiewit Construction Company, a corporation, 1963, 15 
Utah 2d 20, 386 P. 2d 616. 
The opinion in that case indicates that the reasoning 
approved by three members of the Court favored freedom 
from third party liability in a case such as we have here. 
Part of the well reasoned opinion written by Mr. Jus-
tice Crockett of the Court is as follows: 
"In approaching the question here presented it is 
well to keep in mind that the philosophy behind the 
Workman's Compensation Act encompasses two 
main objectives. The first is to assure that an em-
ployee who is injured in employment will have 
necessary medical and hospital care and modest but 
certain compensation for his injury, with resulting 
benefits to himself, his family and to society general-
ly, the other is to afford employers a measure of 
protection against exorbitant claims for injuries"-. 
"The language of the statute preserving an action 
against ' ... third persons' who are 'not in the same 
employment . . . ' seems plainly designed to apply to 
strangers to the employment and not to co-workers 
jointly engaged in the same endeavor. For example 
an employee is working for a contractor in street con-
struction when a passing motorist negligently injures 
him. He is entitled to the workman's compensation; 
and also to sue the motorist. This is logical and just, 
because the fact that the plaintiff is covered by work-
man's compensation should give no protection to the 
motorist who wrongfully injured him. But there is a 
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ma~ke~, distinction ?etween that and the instant sit-
uation. ( 617) (I tahcs supplied for emphasis.) 
"In reference to the Kiewit employees, he said that ' 
they ' ... worked with them fairly closely ... ' and 
that he was directed where to drill by Kiewit engi. 
neers." (618) 
"The other important purpose of the Workman's , 
Compensation Act, which must be given recognition 
and effect, is that it permits employers to pay fees 
for workmen's compensation insurance thereby safe-
guard themselves against possible disastrous claims 
for injuries which they may not be able to bear. This 
also allows employers to so plan and manage their , 
affairs as to make the wheels of industry run, with 
its resulting benefits, including jobs for employees, 
both the giving of full effect to the act, and doing 
justice to the employer; require that it be so inter-
preted and applied as to afford the employer the in· 
tended protection as well as conferring the advan-
tages it does upon the employee." (618) (Italics sup-
plied.) 
Mr. Justice Wade dissented on the ground that he did 
not regard the affidavits as sufficient to show interrelated 
control and supervision to a degree to support a summary 
judgment. Mr. Justice Henroid similarly dissented. 
The Cook decision, supra, established that the Utah Su· 
preme Court does not hold to the quid pro quo theory for 
determining co-contractor immunity from tort liability 
for the injury to the employee of one contractor arising 
from the negligence of a co-employee of another contrac· 
tor working on the same project. Peter Kiewit Sons Com· 
pany was not providing workmen's compensation cover· 
age for employees of the co-contractor Crocker Construe· 
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tion Company, Inc. AB stated by author Durrant in his 
article on Thtrd Party Liability in 9 Ut. L. Rev. No. 4, 
Winter, 1965, 939 at 957: 
Having responsibility for compensation insurance 
premiums (of the injured co-employee of another 
contractor) does not seem to be an indispensible 
factor under the Utah cases in determining whether 
a contractor has tort immunity. 
The reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court in the Cook 
case is supported by twelve of the thirteen cases having 
been written by other appellate courts. 
The leading case of Thompson v. Kiester et. al., 1930, 
141 Okla. 69, 283 P. 1018 is a case in point. Headnote 4 
reads in part: 
In determining whether or not the Industrial Com-
mission has exclusive jurisdiction over an injured 
employee, the fact that the one causing the injury, 
was not liable to the injured party for compensation 
under the act is not the determining factor. 
Headnote 2 reads: 
Where the owner of an oil and gas lease employes a 
drilling contractor to furnish all the tools and labor 
necessary for drilling an oil well, and agrees to pay 
the sum of $100 per day therefor, and said person so 
employed to drill the well injures the plaintiff, who 
is an employee of a rig contractor, and said rig con-
tractor is at the time employed by the owner to make 
certain repairs upon the rig at the well that the de-
fendants are drilling, both the drilling contractor and 
the defendants are "in the same employ" as intended 
by the Workmen's Compensation Act of this State. 
The Court stated the legal test as follows 283 Pac. 1018, 
1022: 
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We do n_ot think that the ~rm "in the same employ," 
as used m the Compensation Act, was so limited that 
both parties must be hired and working directly un-
1 
der the same person. If they are engaged in the same 
general business . . . and for the same general em. 
ployers, they are in the same employ as intended by 
the act ... 
In this Nauman case the architect and the contractor 
and their respective employees are engaged in the 
same general business and for the same employers . 
the "Joint Authority". 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation 1961, Vol. 2, Sec. 
72.20, p. 173 writes: 
72.20 Employer and co-employees immune. A num-
ber of states expressly exclude co-employees from 1 
the category of "third persons". 14 (14. Among the , 
states in this group are Alabama, Colorado, New 
York, Oregon and Utah.") 
The right to compensation or benefits under this 
chapter shall be the exclusive remedy to an em-
ployee, or in the case of death his dependants, when 
such employee is injured or killed by the negligence 
or wrong of another in the same employ. 
It is now well established that the effect of this en-
actment is to bar all suits against co-employees by 
injured employees or by subrogated employers. 16. 
The same has been held in Virginia under a statute 
immunizing the employer "or those conducting his 
business". 17 ... although the opposite conclusion 
was reached in North Carolina. 
The 1965 supplement to the 1961 Volume by Larson 
adds citations of twelve cases holding third parties and 
their employees immune from tort liability because con-
sidered to be within the phrase "in the same employ-
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ment" or similar phrase in the Workmen's Compensation 
Law. We quote further from Larson's volume: 
For example, see Roberts v. Gagnon 1 App. Div. 2d, 
297, 149 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1956). Where the co-em-
ployee is immune from suit so is his principal. Other-
wise the co-employee would not receive complete 
protection because his principal, if found liable, 
could recover from his agent, the co-employee. 
The bar was held to apply when a milk collector was 
assaulted by an employee of the dairy to which the 
milk was brought, since employees of the two em-
ployers had to work together in weighing and empty-
ing the cans at the dairy. Atkinson v. Farview Dairy 
Farms, (Ore.) 222 P. 2d 732 (1950). Larson Sec. 
72.34. 
In support of the reasoning of the Utah Cook case, 
supra, Larson cites cases from eight other states as fol-
lows: 
Mayes v. Marshall Field & Co., 351 Ill. App. 329, 115 
N.W. 2d 99 (1953); Worthington v. Industrial Com-
mission, 85 Ariz. 310, 338 P. 2d 363 (1959); Saala v. 
McFarland, 29 Ca. Comp. 306, 41 Cal. Rep. 530 
(1964); Helmie v. Paine, 369 Mich. 114, 119 N.W. 2d 
574 (1963); Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309, 130 S.E. 
2d 582 ( 1936) ; and several other cumulative cases on 
varying fact situations. 
In Zenchak v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc. 150 So. 2d 
727 (Fla. 1963), the Court wrote: 
The owner of the rental truck, leased to plaintiff's 
employer and driven by a co-employee, was immune 
from the common-law action. The owner was not vi-
cariously liable under the dangerous-instrumentality 
doctrine. The negligent lessee's driver was also the 
plaintiff's (immune) co-employee. 
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In Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309, 130 S.E. 2d 582 (1963), 
the Court wrote: 
-whether the driver of the car in which the plain- 1 
tiff was injured was a co-worker of an independent 
contractor paid by their mutual employer to supply 
transportation, the driver was engaged in the bus-
iness of the plaintiff's employer at the time of the 
accident. Common-law action against the driver dis- ' 
missed. 
In Pettaway v. Mcconaghy, 367 Mich. 651, 116 N.W. 
2d 789 (1963), the statute exempted "all natural per-
sons who carry on the work of the employer, regard-
less of the type of activity performed. Therefore the 
person who was the president, manager and sole 
stockholder of the corporation was such an exempt 
individual. 
The continuing interrelation of the parties in this case 
is, that Christiansen Brothers, Inc. and its employees and 
Harold K. Beecher and Associates, a Utah corporation, 
and its employees were all working for the same joint 
owners, for the same purpose and to the same end-the 
construction and the supervision of the construction re-
specti vely of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice Building. 
The interrelated rights of control and supervision be-
tween the employees of the contractor and the architect, 
although different in kind, existed daily and continuously 
for several years. 
The contractor and its employees were bringing ma-
terials and equipment for the building and the utility , 
tunnel, and constructing them into form according to 735 
pages of detailed specifications drafted into the contract 
by the architect. The architect and its employees were 
daily watching and supervising to see that the materials 
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and equipment were of the kind and quality specified, 
and that the installation and construction into the desig-
nated structures conformed in result to those detailed 
specifications. 
Defendants respectfully submit that they qualify as 
co-employees under Section 35-1-62 N.C.A. 1953, and the 
reasoning of the Cook case supra and that the dismissal 
of plaintiff's complaints should be affirmed on that 
ground. 
POINT VII 
PLAINTIFF'S CASES ARE NOT IN POINT 
Plaintiff cites five cases of misfeasance of architects 
which are clearly inapplicable to an alleged claim for 
non-feasance of claimed supervisory duties of an arch-
itect. Each case deserves analysis on its particular facts. 
The general rule is stated by the Supreme Court of 
Illinois in Miller v. DeWitt, infra, which, with two modi-
fications added here in parenthesis, states the rule ac-
cording to the few cases in this area, except for the late 
New York cases, which are more restrictive in favor of 
architect's non-liability. 
As a general rule, it has been said that the general 
duty to 'supervise the work' merely creates a duty to see 
that the building when constructed (and while being 
constructed) meets the plans and specifications con-
tracted for (which call for construction without hidden 
defects). Clinton v. Boehm, 124 N.Y. Supp. 789, 139 App.· 
Div. 73; Garden City Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 
255 P. 2d 352, 356; Day v. U.S. Radiator Corporation, 241 
La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660, 666. 
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Plaintiff cites Montijo v. Swift, 1963, 219 Cal. App. 2d 
351, 33 Cal. R. 133 (App. Brief p. 15) which is certainly 
not in point with the instant case. That is clearly a case 
of alleged misfeasance, not of non-feasance. The plaintiff 1, 
alleged that the architect had designed a plan and pr0-
vided specifications for a stairway that was interently un- 1 
safe and dangerous to invitees in a bus depot using the 
stairway and exercising ordinary prudence in its use. The 
facts alleging an unsafe condition were set out in detail. 
The architect had designed and specified a stairway I 
with a side wall and handrail which came one full step 
short of the bottom landing. Plaintiff holding to the hand-
rail and instinctively believing she was at floor level 
when her hand reached the bottom of the handrail al-
legedly fell and was injured by reason of the faulty con-
struction. The construction was done in accordance with 
the allegedly faulty plans and specifications of the arch-
itect. The plan and specifications, and the construction 
pursuant thereto, was found to be a semi-hidden defect 
negligently planned and specified by the defendant arch· 
itect, for which liability was affirmed. This case supports 
defendants, not the plaintiff. There is no allegation of 
defective plans and specifications in this Nauman case. 
The latest case in New York would reach a different 
result because the defect was observable and not a hidden 
defect. 
In the case of Inman v. Binghampton Housing Author· 
ity et. al. 1957, 3 N.Y. 2d 137, 164 N.Y. Supp. 699, 143 N.E. 
2d 895, 59 A.L.R. 2d 1072, plaintiff alleged negligence of 
the architect in designing and providing specifications for 
a too-short railing on a balcony and a too-narrow space 
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between the door, when opened outward, and the railing, 
by which allegedly a child was caused to fall over the 
railing and was injured. 
The Court, which has probably considered. more cases 
against architects than any other state except perhaps 
California, held: 
Liability (of the architect) exists only for injuries 
caused by hidden defects or concealed. dangers sim-
ilar as is the law of responsibility of manufacturers. 
The Court adopted the reasoning and rule for architects 
as it exists for manufacturers today following "the fa-
mous decision" in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 1916, 
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, which held defendant manu-
facturer liable for a hidden defect in a wooden auto-
mobile wheel which collapsed injuring plaintiff. 
That case supports the defendants, not the plaintiff. 
The New York rule of liability of architects for alleged 
negligence in design and specifications is: IF THE DE-
FECT OR SITUATION IS PATENT, KNOWN OR DIS-
CERNABLE BY REASONABLE INSPECTION THE IN-
JURY RESULTING THEREFROM IS NOT ACTION-
ABLE. THE SITUATION HERE WAS PATENT, 
KNOWN AND DISCERNABLE. 
The New York Appellate Court wrote in Inman v. 
Binghampton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y. 2d 137 -
The cases establish that the manufacturer of a ma-
chine or other article, "dangerous because of the way 
in which it functions, and patently so, owes to . . . 
(remote users) a duty merely to make it free from 
latent defects and concealed dangers." (Campo v. 
Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 471, 95 N.E. 2d 802, 803.) "We 
have not yet reached the state," we wrote in the 
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Campo case, supra, 301 N.Y. at pages 472-473, 95 N.E. 
2d at page 804, "where a manufacturer is under the 
duty of making a machine accident proof or fooJ. , 
proof." ... Suffice it to note that, in cases dealing 
with a manufacturer's liability for injuries to remote 
users, the stress has always been upon the duty of 
guarding against hidden defects and of giving notice 
of concealed dangers (cases cited). In point of fact 
I 
several of the cases actually declare that a duty is 
owed, a liability is imposed, only if the defect or 
danger be not "known" or "patent" or discoverable 
"by a reasonable inspection". And, since the presence 
of a latent defect or a danger not generally known is 
precedent to the manufacturers' liability, the absence 
of such a recital in the complaint is fatal to the ex. ' 
istence of a cause of action (against the architect). 
Examination of the pleading before us discloses its 
invalidity. It contains no allegation of any latent de-
fect or concealed danger. It simply complains of (1) 
the absence of a "protective railing, guard or any de-
vice,'' (2) the arc made by the door when opened, 
and (3) the fact that the step did not extend full 
length of the stoop, all patently obvious defects, if, 
indeed, they are defects at all. From none of these 
recitals may it be said that the architects or the 
builder violated a duty owed to users of the stoop. 
Entirely lacking, to paraphrase what we said in the 
Campo case, supra, 301 N.Y. 468, 471, 95 N.E. 2d 802, 
is any suggestion that the structure possessed a 
latent defect or an unknown danger and, in the vecy 
nature of things, entirely lacking is any recital that 
the absence of a railing or other device was unknown 
or undiscoverable. As we have already indicated, 
such omissions are fatal. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Clemens v. Benzinger, 1925, 
311 App. Div. 586, 207 N.Y. Supp. 539 which again is not 
31 
in point. This was a case of affirmative conduct of mis-
feasance by the architect in allowing defective amended 
plans and specifications for anchoring steel "H" columns 
for support of a grandstand. The original plans and spe-
cifications required anchor bolts to be set two feet deep 
with steel horizontal flat flanges extending outward sev-
eral inches to be set at the time the concrete was poured 
to fasten the steel "H" columns securely in place. 
It was discovered that this had not been done by the 
contractor on alternate places where the concrete block 
was poured onto which the "H" columns were to be 
placed. At this point, the architect had the option of or-
dering the alternate concrete bases which now could not 
allow fastening on anchor bolts removed and replaced 
and that the contractor follow his safe plans and specifi-
cations as originally drawn, delivered and accepted by 
the owner. 
Instead of insisting that his safe plans and specifica-
tions be followed, the architect obviously yielded to argu-
ment and approved an amended or modified plan and 
specification which allowed the contractor to drill holes 
in the solid alternate concrete bases and insert therein 
anchor bolts of less depth having no horizontal flange at 
the bottom of each bolt as a safe anchor, and to allow the 
contractor merely to grout in the drilled holes around the 
bolts with sand and cement. The new plan and specifica-
tion called for the protruding horizontal lugs to be re-
moved. As a result of these affirmative acts of misfeas-
ance of the architect, an "H'' column fell striking plain-
tiff's decedent and killing him. 
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The negligence on which the Court found liability w , 
not merely non-feasance in supervision by the archit as 
It was the proximate result of his calculated affirrnat~t. 
act in consenting to modify his original safe plans e 
if. t· 1 ana spec ica ions to a p an and specification for anchorin ' 
the particular "H" column which was unsafe and in~ 
1 
herently dangerous as a hidden defect. ! 
I 
l 
The case of Paxton v. Alameda County et. al., 1958, m 11 
Cal. App. 2d 393, 259, P. 2d 932 is not in point for plaintiff. : 
It is true that Alameda County was held responsible. 
However, it was not held responsible for non-feasance 
because the architect as the owner's agent (some cases 
say independent contractor) failed to supervise as to the • 
means or manner of nailing down the defective sheathing 
on the roof which allowed the plaintiff workmen carry. 
ing buckets of hot tar to fall through the roof and be 
injured. I 
What happened in the Paxton case was that the arch· f 
itect saw inferior roof sheathing to that of his specifica· I 
tion lying on the ground next to the building, and he, 
knowingly, recklessly and heedlessly, allowed the in· I 
ferior roof sheathing to be installed in violation of ~ ! 
duty to see that his plan and specification in this part1c· I 
ular detail, which would have insured safety for the I 
workmen on the roof, was followed. Alameda County was 
1
1 
held liable because of this misfeasance of the architect. 
The complaint was rightly dismissed against the architect I 
because it merely charged as to him that his specification : 
called for an inferior, unsafe grade of sheathing and too I 
wide spacing of rafters which allegations were found un· f 
i true. , 
I 
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In briefing this case, Mr. Cassity inadvertently agrees 
with defendant's position that the architect's duty is to 
supervise to secure compliance with specifications in the 
completed work. He writes: 
The architect in that case had the contractural obli-
gation to prepare the plans and specifications and to 
direct and supervise the construction work ... to see 
that the building was completed in strict accordance 
with the plans and specifications therefore. (App. 
Brief, p. 19) 
The controlling difference is that in the Nauman case, 
the architect did not make any plans and specifications 
for the excavation. He had no right or authority to pro-
vide any plans or specifications for the general con-
tractor to follow in making an excavation in which the 
utility tunnel was to be constructed according to definite 
plans and specifications for the utility tunnel. 
HAD THE ARCHITECT DRAFTED PLANS AND 
SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE EXCAVATION, THE 
GENERAL CONTRACTOR WOULD HA VE BEEN 
FULLY WITHIN HIS CONTRACT RIGHT AND 
AUTHORITY TO TELL THE ARCHITECT TO 
MIND HIS OWN BUSINESS. 
Plaintiff cites loose dicta from the case of Cravt>lini 
and Anderson Co. v. Scholer & Fuller Associated Arch-
itects, an Arizona corporation et. al., 1960, 89 Ariz. 24, 
357 P. 2d 611. This case is not even remotely in point on 
the Nauman case. The loose dicta quoted by plaintiff's 
counsel is wholly out of context. The case was one in 
which the contractors brought action against the arch-
itect and its two co-managers for conspiracy in intention-
ally, deliberately and maliciously undertaking to inter-
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fere with plaintiff's contract rights in the construction 
contract in 14 particular ways set out in the complaint 
in detail, and in deliberately undertaking to bankrupt 
plaintiff to plaintiff's damages of $200,000.00 . . 
'Dhe Court stated that the defense of immunity of an 
architect in acting as arbitrator under the contract must 
be recognized, but that the complaint pleaded an ordin-
ary tort action of malicious interference with contract by 
co-conspirators which allegations stated facts far outside 
the quasi-judicial function of the architect as an arbi- , 
trator and reversed for a new trial. 
Plaintiff's counsel relies strongly on the reasoning of 
the dicta of the Illinois intermediate appellate court in ' 
its lengthy opinion in the case of Miller v. DeWitt et. al., 
1965, 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E. 2d, 249. Suffice to say 
the case rests on an extension of liability against arch-
itects created by the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 
1963, Chap. 48, par. 60, 69). Both the intermediate ap-
pellate court and the Supreme Court of Illinois (citation 
to latter case not yet available) held that said act gov-
erned the case. The injuries to three plaintiffs resulted 
from the collapse of tubular steel shoring which was 
placed to support a part of the gymnasium roof, weighing 
many tons, from which the steel trusses supporting the ' 
roof were to be removed to allow for a new extension of 
the roof over an enlarged gymnasium. The Supreme 
Court wrote: 
Turning next to the counts alleging a violation of the 
Structural Work Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, Chap. 48, 
par. 60, 69) the architects contend that the sho~g 
was not within the purview of the act, that there is f 
no evidence that the shores were inadequate, and I 
I 
t 
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that the architects were not "in charge of the work", 
so as to be liable for plaintiffs' injuries. We have ex-
amined the record and we find that the opinion of 
the appellate court adequately disposes of the first 
two contentions holding that the shoring was within 
the purview of the act and could be found to have 
been inadequate. 
Whether the architect came within the phrase in the 
Structural Work Act as one "in charge of the work" de-
pended on whether the work came within the tort doc-
trine of an ultrahazardous activity. (Rest. Torts, Sec. 
520 et. seq.) Both courts found that removing the steel 
supports from a gymnasium roof was an ultrahazardous 
activity and the right granted the architect to stop work 
became a duty under the particular circumstances. 
The Supreme Court writes a long paragraph describ-
ing the known inherent danger of removing steel supports 
from a multi-ton gymnasium roof and concludes: 
The weight of the new roof could be computed from 
the information shown on the plans; and by sub-
tracting that figure from the total reaction shown on 
the plans the weight of the old roof could be obtained. 
The Supreme Court throughout its opinion emphasizes 
that it is confirming its opinion to the particular facts of 
the case, and that the jury may have misunderstood the 
duty of the architect. The Supreme Court, in reversing 
the case for a new trial, wrote: 
Since this case is close on its facts, we believe the 
failure to withdraw these allegations from the jury 
permitted them to premise guilt on a false assump-
tion of the architect's duties. We therefore feel that 
a new trial must be granted. 
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The Supreme Court of Illinois found that the general 
agreement of the architect for supervision and a right to 
stop work did not give the architect the right to interfere 
with the methods, means or techniques of the independ-
ent contractor except in the ultrahazardous activity sit-
uation. It wrote: 
We feel that except for the duty to stop work in the 
event of an obviously hazardous dereliction of duty ! 
on the part of the contractor, the architects were 
under no duty with regard to the methods, means or 
techniques used by the contractor to shore the roof. 
Clinton v. Boehm, 139 App. Div. 73, 124 N.Y. S. 789, 
791; Potter v. Gilbert, 115 N.Y.S. 425, at 428, (aff'd 
by Court of Appeals 196 N.Y. 576); Olsen v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 10 App. Div. 2d 539, 205 N.Y.S. 
2d 60, 65 (aff'd by Court of Appeals 9 N.Y. 2d 829, 
215 N.Y.S. 2d 773, 774); Day v. National U.S. Radia-
tor Corp. 241 La. 288, 128 S. 2d 660, 666; Garden City 
Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 P. 2d 352, 356; 
Charles Meads & Co. v. City of New York, 191 App. 
Div. 365, 181 N.Y.S. 704, 707. 
The facts in the Napman case are entirely different 
from those of the Miller case. There the contractor was 
engaged in an ultrahazardous activity of removing steel 
supports from a concrete gymnasium roof. Here the State 
Industrial Commission inspector had inspected the open 
excavation, found the shoring inadequate, stopped the 
work, ordered definite and specific amount and kind of 
shoring used which in the judgment of the State In· 
dustrial Commission would comply with its Safety Reg· 
ulations. 
Here laos by official inspection of the State Industrial 
Commission the pattern of shoring used by the contrac· 
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tor from September 18, through October 4th was found 
to be in compliance with Safety Regulations of the State 
Industrial Commission for excavating an open trench. 
A rule of presumption is that a condition shown to exist 
is presumed to continue until facts show the contrary. 
Clearly, the contractor would not shore the excavation in 
an amount and kind appreciably greater than the pattern 
of shoring twice approved over a two weeks period by the 
State Industrial Commission's inspector. 
POINT VIII 
ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT GRANTS ARCHITECT 
ACTION OVER AGAINST THE CONTRACTOR. 
The Illinois intermediate appellate court had held that 
under the Structural Work Act the architect and the 
general contractor were joint tort feasers and that the 
architect could not recover contribution or exhoneration 
against the general contractor. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed on this point 
and followed the distinction between misfeasance and 
non-feasance of architects which was clearly established 
in the leading New York case of Potter v. Gilbert, supra, 
in order to fix the ultimate liability on the person pri-
marily liable - the general contractor. 
One issue was whether the architect could have an ac-
tion over against the contractor because of violation of 
the protection allegedly granted the general contractor 
by "Sections 5 and 11 of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, Chap. 48, par. 138.5, 138.11). 
Section 11 provides that compensation under the act, 
"shall be the measure of the responsibility" of a cov-
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ered employer. Section 5 provides: "No common law 
or statutory right to recover damages from the em. 
ployer or his employees for injury or death sustained 
by any employee while engaged in the line of his 
duty as such employee, other than the compensation 
herein provided, shall be available to any employee 
who is covered by the provisions of this Act ... 
On this issue the Supreme Court held: I 
1 
I 
We think that the jury could find that the contractor , 
was an active tort feasor while the architect's fault 
was merely passive. We conclude that this is a proper 
case for a third party complaint and that the trial 
court erred in dismissing the architects' third party 
1 complaint on motion . . . I 
Thus, defendants contend, as they have in all three 
trial briefs, that there is no case that decides in absence 
of statute that an architect is liable for non-feasance in 
a fact situation where the independent contractor has 
absolute discretion as to means, methods and technique 
of making a temporary excavation and regarding which 
the architect has absolutely no authority or right to make 
any plans or specifications which the contractor must 
follow, and which activity does not come within the tort 
doctrine of ultrahazardous activity. 
POINT IX 
ON FACTS IN THE RECORD, PLAINTIFF'S COM· 
PLAINT DOES NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Defendants contend that because of immunity as co· 
employees, no valid complaint can be made against them. 
Assuming, without admitting, that a valid complaint of 
negligence for non-feasance could be drafted if the pat· 
I 
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tern of shoring had not been officially approved, still the 
complaint would be fatally defective. 
Plaintiff's complaint does not allege a duty of the arch-
itect according to the standard of professional learning, 
skill and prudence of architects practicing in the vicinity, 
nor any violation of that established standard of care by 
the architect or any of its agents in performance of its 
supervisory duties; both of which are necessary allega-
tions. Bourie v. Spring Valley Water Co., 1908, 8 Cal. App. 
588, 97 P. 530. 
Bancroft Code, P. 1 Vol. 4, Section 2038 states that, 
The facts from which the duty flows must be stated. 
And, Note 11, p. 3536 states: The conditions - from 
which the duty flows must be set forth in such way 
that the court can draw the legal conclusion. Cases 
in support are there cited. 
38 Am. Jur. Section 258 reads: 
The general theory of pleading for negligence - is 
that the pleader must set forth the facts of his claim 
with such certainty as to reasonably inform the other 
party what is proposed to be proved in the case so 
that the latter may have an opportunity to meet such 
facts and prepare his defense. 
Bancroft Code Pleading, Section 2041 reads: 
It is not sufficient however, at least as against 
demurrer or motion, to allege in general terms that 
any injury was caused by the negligence of the de-
fendant. - Negligence is not an act itself, but the 
fact which defines the character of the act and makes 
it a legal wrong. 
Plaintiff simply alleges that there was a right of the 
architect to stop work, if in the judgment of the architect 
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along (not in cooperation with others and subject to con. 
currence of. the City Engineer and the County Engineer) 
the stopping of work was necessary to correct a situation 
which allegedly did not comply with the Safety Regula. 
tions of the State Industrial Commission. Evidently what 
the State Industrial Commission approved as safe, Mr. 
Cassity judged to be unsafe. 
Plaintiff's complaint does not state any of the farts 
or circumstances to support his legal conclusion that the 
I 
excavation was dangerous and unsafe causing an extreme 1 
hazard to workmen or in what respect the excavation 
1
r 
failed to comply with the safety regulations of the Utah • State Industrial Commission. The facts in the record I 
show that the pattern of shoring was officially approved 
by the State Industrial Commission (Affidavit P. 175-
177). 
Plaintiff's complaint arbitrarily substitutes the judg-
ment of plaintiff's counsel for the discretinary judgment 
of the City Engineer, the County Engineer and the arch· 
itect "acting in cooperation" on the matter. (Comp. R. 
148). 
Plaintiff's complaint does not plead facts showing an 
ultrahazardous situation or condition which the Illinois 
Supreme Court says is necessary to require work stop· 
page. It clearly rests on the theory of res ipsa loquitur 
and on the theory that because an accident happened, the 
architect is an insurer or guarantor of the freedom of 
workmen from an accidental injury. The proximate cause 
of the accident is alleged as merely a conclusion from 
hindsight rather than a statement of facts from which 
forseeability of injury might result. 
! 
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Plaintiff recognizes in his pleading that the unusual 
and extra-ordinary right to close down work is not that 
of the architect alone but that the architect's contracts 
require such extreme action to be done in cooperation 
with the City and County Engineers (Comp. par. 8, R. 
148) and under the superior supervision of the City Engi-
neer and the County Engineers. (Architects Agreement, 
par. 13, R. 161). Plaintiff does not alleged neglect of this 
necessary concerted action. 
In concluding, we quote from the early and leading 
case of Potter v. Gilbert, 1909, 130 App. Div. 632, 115 N.Y. 
Supp. 425, aff'd 1909, 169 N.Y. 576, 90 N.E. 1165, cited 
by the Illinois Supreme Court with approval. 
The plaintiff does allege that the architect prepared 
unsafe plans and specifications, but there is no alle-
gation that the collapse of the wall was owing to any 
defect in this regard. It may well be that an architect, 
acting under a contract with the owner, by which it 
is his duty to supervise the construction of the build-
ing, who knowingly permits a departure from the 
plans or specifications, would be liable to a party in-
jured thereby, and that he would also be liable for 
failing to condemn any improper work which he dis-
covers; but there is no allegation that the architect 
permitted a departure from the plans and specifica-
tions, or that he knew there had been a departure 
therefrom in time to remedy the defect before the 
collapse of the wall . . . and under this rule, the 
charge is merely that the architect failed to exercise 
due diligence in supervising the construction. (Italics 
added.) 
The allegation that it was the duty of the defendant 
to condemn the wall is insufficient to show negli-
gence, for the reason that the facts from which the 
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duty flowed are not set forth. At most then the com-
plaint merely charges an om!ssion of duty on the part 
of the architect while acting for his principal, the 
owner, which constitutes only non-feasance for 
which he may be liable to his employer, but is not 
liable to third parties. (Italics added.) 
If the architect were guilty of any affirmative act 
which contributes to the accident, as by directing a 
departure from the plans or specifications, or the use 
of improper materials, or knowingly suffering such 
departure from the plans or specifications, or such 
use of improper materials, or failing to condemn im-
proper work, he would doubtless be liable; but there 
is no such charge made in the complaint. (Italics 
added.) 
Wherefore defendants pray that this Honorable Court 
affirm the dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's com-
plaints. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. Ladru Jensen 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
